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The Federal-State Medicaid
Match
When two levels of government share administration
of a program, there are likely to be points of contention.
When one of those levels consists of 50 states (and six
jurisdictions), each with different administrations,
capacities, and politics, the points increase exponen-
tially, bringing in issues of fairness and equity as well.
In the federal-state Medicaid program, commonly
described as a “partnership” that provides health
services for low-income families, some elderly, and
persons with disabilities, states must spend their own or
their localities’ own dollars in order to receive matching
funds for the costs of covered services. The federal-
state match has been a continuing area of conflict
between the federal government and the states and
among the states themselves.
Since the latter 1980s, some states have used
“creative financing” to get more federal dollars than
they otherwise would qualify for. In turn, the federal
government has moved to close the loopholes that have
made what it regards as “abusive financing” possible.
The loopholes have included provisions making it
possible for states to make excessive payments to public
health facilities, get donations from or level taxes on
providers, and maximize payments to disproportionate-
share hospitals (DSHs), in order to increase their federal
Medicaid matches.
The latest skirmish came this year. The chairman of
the Senate Finance Committee, Sen. William V. Roth (R-
Del.), and the director of the Medicaid program in the
Department of Health and Human Services’ (DHHS)
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), Timothy
Westmoreland, balked at states’ use of so-called intergov-
ernmental transfers (IGTs) to increase their federal
matches. Under this acknowledged gimmick, states get
transfers of funds from local governments within their
borders and put up the transferred money to obtain
additional federal matching dollars. They do this in order
to avoid upper payment limits (UPLs), which restrict
states from making Medicaid payments that are higher
than the Medicare program would pay for the same
services. Under current regulations, states are able to pay
non-state-owned or -operated facilities far more than the
actual costs of care and claim federal matching on the
expenditures. This practice is estimated to have cost the
Medicaid program an additional $3.7 billion in fiscal year
(FY) 2000 alone.
At Roth’s insistence, HCFA published a proposed
rule in the October 10 Federal Register banning the
practice over time but leaving a loophole involving
certain public hospitals that serve the poor. As the
chairman pushed for closure on the ban, certain
states—those with political clout and lobbying strength
—sought to include their own private loopholes in
omnibus legislation that was pending at the end of the
106th Congress.
Over the years, both the General Accounting Office
(GAO) of the U.S. Congress and the Office of the
Inspector General (IG), DHHS—the respective con-
gressional and executive watchdogs of the federal
purse—have identified successive loopholes. A series
of legislators and executive officials have moved to
close one loophole after another, but each time a new
one has opened up (sometimes because Congress or
HCFA sanctioned it), inevitably resulting in a new tug-
of-war. The conflict reflects philosophical and political
differences in federal Medicaid policy and state Medic-
aid practice and a clash of values over whether or not
the end, achieving a “noble goal,” justifies the means,
using “ill-gotten gains.” Usually, the noble goal is to
maintain a health safety net for vulnerable people, even
though they are not necessarily Medicaid beneficiaries.
However, at times, states have chosen to address other
health or even non-health-related needs.
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Complicating the situation are the issue’s links to a
Medicaid policy that goes back to 1981 but which was
not fully implemented until 1988. That is a provision
for state Medicaid programs to make payments (the
Medicaid DSH adjustment) to “take into account the
situation of hospitals which serve a disproportionate
number of low-income patients with special needs.”1
For example, earlier loopholes—provider donation and
provider tax programs that states undertook to increase
their federal Medicaid funds—helped finance their
DSH payments, because states could exceed the statu-
tory UPL in providing funds to hospitals providing high
volumes of care to low-income patients.
In this Forum session, NHPF will focus on the
current federal-state Medicaid match issues that are the
subject of HCFA’s proposed rule on UPLs. Taking into
account the history of the issue, the meeting will lay out
what is at stake, how HCFA is addressing it, what kinds
of approaches states are taking, how Congress is getting
involved, and what the outlook is for the future.
THE CURRENT CLAMPDOWN
The Proposed Regulation on IGTs
HCFA’s proposed rule addresses a loophole in
Medicaid regulations that allows states to set Medicaid
rates for public facilities, such as county- and city-owned
hospitals, in excess of both the average payment to other,
nonpublic facilities, and the actual cost of providing
covered services to persons who are Medicaid beneficia-
ries. (In 1987, HCFA required states to adhere to the UPL
for state-owned or -operated as well as privately operated
facilities.) Under this loophole, 19 states permit the public
facilities to claim higher Medicaid reimbursement rates
(which are federally matched) and then divert or transfer
some or all of the federal funds for other state programs.
According to HCFA, the agency has applications pending
from nine other states to do the same.
The regulation would phase out such arrangements
over five years for states with approved plans in effect
before October 1, 1999, and over two years for states
that have lapsed since that deadline, with the first
changes starting in FY 2002. “This change is necessary
to ensure that the Medicaid regulations conform to
Medicaid statutory requirements that promote efficiency
and economy,” the proposed regulation says.2
The proposed rule would modify Medicaid UPLs for
the following services: inpatient hospital, outpatient
hospital, nursing facility, intermediate care facility for the
mentally ill, and clinic. In terms of each type of Medicaid
inpatient service, “current regulations place an upper limit
on overall aggregate payments to all facilities and a
separate aggregate upper limit on payments made to state-
operated facilities.” The proposed regulation “would
establish a third aggregate upper limit that would apply to
payments made to all other types of government facilities
that are not state-owned or state-operated.”
In terms of outpatient hospital and clinic services,
“current regulations place a single upper limit on
aggregate payments made to all facilities.” The proposal
would establish “a separate aggregate upper limit on
payments made to state-owned or -operated facilities
and an aggregate upper limit on payments made to all
other government-owned or -operated facilities.”3
There is a significant exception, however, one that the
chairman of the Finance Committee strongly opposes.
States still will be able to pay as high as 150 percent of the
UPL to public hospitals that are not state-owned or
-operated. The exception is based on HCFA’s belief that
“allowing higher Medicaid payments will fully reflect the
value of public hospitals’ services to Medicaid and the
populations it serves.” Because the agency is concerned
that the “public hospitals may be required by state or local
governments to transfer back a portion of payments that
they receive under Medicaid,” it indicates that it will
require in its final rule a separate identification and
reporting mechanism on how the funds are used.4
The proposed rule, which Acting HCFA Administra-
tor Michael M. Hash signed on October 3 and DHHS
Secretary Donna E. Shalala announced on October 5,5
had a 30-day comment period that ended on November
9. In a statement reacting to the secretary’s announce-
ment, Roth concluded that the Clinton administration
would not be able to finalize the regulation before it
leaves office at the end of January. Commenting on the
exception, he said: 
The proposed regulation permits facilities to be reim-
bursed for providing services at a rate one and a half
times what Medicare would have paid for a given
service. Then states are free to pocket the difference
between that payment level and the often much lower
Medicaid payment rates through intergovernmental
transfers. Not only does the regulation allow those who
are exploiting the program to continue to do so, it also
invites all others to come in and help themselves. The
regulation permits the scam to continue while only
modestly attempting to contain its magnitude.6
The chairman included a provision to implement the
regulation in omnibus legislation, the Medicare, Medic-
aid, and SCHIP (State Children’s Health Insurance
Program) Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of
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2000, that the 106th Congress was seeking to pass as
this issue brief went to press. Under the Roth language,
the regulation would become effective on December 31,
2000. At the same time, California, Illinois, New York,
Pennsylvania, New Mexico, and Wisconsin have gotten
provisions in the bill protecting them from the regula-
tion’s ban, raising the ire of other states and their
legislators that the payments could undermine the
Medicaid program itself. The Congressional Budget
Office has given the pending UPL reforms a “score” of
$21.5 billion in savings to the federal government over
five years and $76.7 billion over ten years, even with
the loopholes that would be permitted in the regulation.
Background on HCFA’s Latest Action
The most recent round in the federal-state tug-of-war
started last spring when HCFA circulated a draft
regulatory proposal (to some state organizations and
other concerned parties) to extend the UPLs to county
and city facilities. Meant to address the UPL loophole,
it reflected Westmoreland’s concern that HCFA’s
policy of allowing states to draw down more Medicaid
dollars through the IGT mechanism was unfair, not only
to states that were not taking part in the practice but
also to beneficiaries for whom the Medicaid program
was intended.7
The Finance Committee subsequently asked the
GAO to investigate the matter and pressed Shalala to
take action. On June 30, Roth released letters to both in
a news release charging “that tens of billions of Medic-
aid dollars are being bilked from federal taxpayers to
fill holes in many states’ budgets” and that Medicaid “is
not intended to serve as an accounting gimmick to
funnel increased federal payments to the states.”
Referring to the earlier provider donation and provider
tax controversies, he warned that, “unless the Adminis-
tration acts immediately, we are on the brink of a
spending scandal unlike any we have seen since Medic-
aid was used to pay for roads, bridges, and highways.”8
Westmoreland followed up on July 26 by sending a
letter of intent to state Medicaid directors, with copies
to the American Public Human Services Association,
the National Conference of State Legislatures, and the
National Governors’ Association. In the letter, he
contended that some states are
calculating the maximum amount [the UPL] that, in
theory, could be paid to each Medicaid facility; adding
these amounts together to create excessive payment
rates to a few county or municipal facilities; claiming
federal matching dollars based on these excessive
payment rates; and then directing these county or
municipal facilities to transfer large portions of the
excessive payments back to the state government.9
Estimating that federal Medicaid spending for FY
2000 grew by $3.4 billion over earlier projections, he
attributed $1.9 billion of the increase to funds raised by
the UPL loophole.10 (In the October 10 proposed
regulation, DHHS says the overall impact is “approxi-
mately $3.7 billion in federal spending annually . . .
based on state reported federal fiscal information
submitted with state plan amendments and state expen-
diture information where available.”)11
In the letter, Westmoreland pointed out that some
states are using the additional funds to finance various
health programs. These include helping pay for uncom-
pensated care, circumventing DSH by going beyond its
statutory definition to provide services, boosting the
state share of Medicaid, contributing to SCHIP, and
funding other health programs (such as community-
based care for persons who are elderly or have disabili-
ties). He also cited sources indicating that some states
are using, or intend to use, the additional funds to fill
budget gaps, reduce state debt, give tax decreases, or
pay for education programs. He stated HCFA’s intent to
issue a proposed regulation in the near future.12
When HCFA had not acted by the time Congress
returned from its August recess, the Finance Committee
held a September 6 hearing on the issue. Westmoreland
testified, along with Michael F. Mangano, principal
deputy inspector general, DHHS, and Kathryn G. Allen,
associate director of health financing and public health
issues in the Health, Education, and Human Services
Division of GAO.
The philosophical and political differences that
characterize the debate over this issue were readily
apparent in the opening statements of the senators who
participated in the hearing. Whereas Roth said flatly
that the current IGT gimmick “cannot and will not be
permitted to continue,” Sens. Daniel Patrick Moynihan
(D-N.Y.) and John B. Breaux (D-La.) were more
sanguine. Moynihan indicated that millions of people
are now covered because of the payment policy. Breaux
pointed out that HCFA had approved the applications of
the states that are involved in the practice, which “is
legal until it is declared illegal.” (Westmoreland has
refused to approve any of the pending state Medicaid
plan amendments. Because he does not have the right of
disapproval, the pending amendments lapse into ap-
proval 90 days after submission.) Breaux warned
against blaming states for taking advantage of loopholes
in order “to provide much needed services.” Sen. Chuck
Grassley (R-Iowa), who is next in line for the Finance
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Committee chairmanship in the 107th Congress due to
Roth’s defeat in the November 2000 election, defended
the UPL arrangements of Iowa on the grounds that the
money is being used for Medicaid home- and
community-based services.
Referring to “manipulative financing schemes,”
Mangano used Pennsylvania as an example in his oral
testimony and included Alabama and Nebraska in his
written statement. He stated that Pennsylvania, which
has been involved in the practice since 1991, is expected
“to generate about $900 million in excessive federal
financial participation per year if HCFA does not take
action to stop this abusive and costly practice.”13 The
following is his description of Pennsylvania’s draw-
down of $393.3 million on June 14 of this year:
The Pennsylvania state government calculated a
maximum allowable enhanced payment amount that
could generate a corresponding federal match. It
obtained county government agreements to have 20
counties borrow and transfer, for only one day, tens of
millions of dollars into a state bank account. The state
immediately repaid the amount to the same county
governments, labeling the transaction as a transfer of
enhanced payments to the counties for their county-
owned Medicaid nursing facilities. The state then
billed the federal government for the federal share of
the enhanced payments. The remitted federal share
was commingled in state accounts that could be used
for any purpose the state wished.14
Allen testified that “this financing practice violates
the integrity of Medicaid’s federal/state partnership.”
Citing the actual or intended uses of the additional
funds in the states of Alaska, Iowa, Michigan, New
Jersey, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Washington, she
concluded:
Because of the potential for excessive payments to
persist in other forms, the Congress should consider
implementing a recommendation that remains out-
standing from our 1994 work to enact legislation to
prohibit Medicaid payments that exceed costs to any
government-owned facility. Finally, continuing
attempts to exploit program loopholes also point to
the need to be ever vigilant to identify the next inno-
vative arrangement before it reaches such financial
magnitude that it becomes both a staple of state
financing and a potential threat to the integrity of the
funding partnership.15
A REVIEW OF PAST PRACTICES
The UPL issue is the latest in a series of attempts by
states to drive up the federal dollars that come their way
through the federal Medicaid match. Some involve
excessive payments to state facilities, some the matching
of funds gained through provider donations or taxes, and
some inordinate use of Medicaid DSH payments.
State Facilities
The first loophole to be addressed involved states’
making excessive payments to state-owned or -operated
health facilities in order to increase their federal Medic-
aid matching funds. This practice was restricted in 1987
regulations that established UPLs for state inpatient and
institutional facilities.
Provider Donations and Provider Taxes
The second and third loopholes—states’ use of
provider donations and provider taxes, respectively—in
order to increase their federal Medicaid matching funds
drew more attention during the second half of the 1980s
than the concern about state facilities, which was more
cut-and-dried. In terms of provider donations, HCFA
had published a regulation in 1985 that allowed dona-
tions, both public and private, to be sources of states’
share of Medicaid. In terms of provider taxes, HCFA
had put out a Medicaid manual instruction in 1987 that
distinguished between taxes of general applicability
(imposed on all kinds of goods and services and not just
Medicaid providers) and provider-specific taxes (im-
posed only on health care providers). In general, the
first could be used to draw down federal Medicaid
matching funds and the second could not.
Estimates by HCFA and the DHHS Office of the IG
determined that the state programs cost the federal
government nearly $500 million in FY 1990. By 1991,
the amount of revenue generated from state provider
donation or tax programs was approximately $2.3
billion in federal funds. A survey of state Medicaid
agencies by the American Public Welfare Association
[now the American Public Human Services Associa-
tion] indicated that this figure could rise to $6 billion
in 1992.]16
HCFA, the DHHS IG, GAO, and the Senate Finance
Committee—the same players involved in the current
IGT debate—investigated what they viewed as state
schemes to increase federal Medicaid expenses without
adding to the states’ contributions. A comprehensive
report, Medicaid Provider Tax and Donation Issues,
prepared for the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation by
Health Policy Alternatives, Inc., and issued in July 1992
documented the issues, the federal and state perspec-
tives on them, and the practices, with case studies on
Connecticut, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and
Texas.
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For example, Tennessee had used revenues from
provider donations to draw down more federal dollars
since 1987, when the state legislature authorized the
practice, according to Gordon Bonnyman, author of that
state’s case study. The state faced a rapidly increasing
Medicaid budget, which grew from slightly more than
$1 billion in FY 1988 to nearly $2.3 billion in 1992.
The growth was due in part to the state’s own commit-
ments to expansion of indigent care and state aid for
certain high-volume Medicaid hospitals. It was due in
part to federal statutory changes (such as expanded
coverage for low-income mothers and children). It also
was due in part to other factors, such as health care
inflation. In 1987, 30 of the state’s 150 hospitals
donated $19 million. The largest donor was Regional
Medical Center in Memphis, the largest public hospital
in the state.17
Because Tennessee’s federal Medicaid percentage
was 70 percent (that is, the federal government pays 70
cents and the state pays 30 cents), the $19 million
generated approximately $63 million, Bonnyman
reported. Of the $63 million, $24 million increased
DSH subsidies, $31 million went to expanded Medicaid
coverage for pregnant women and children who were
below 100 percent of the federal poverty level, and the
balance for a rise in the annual inpatient hospital
coverage limit from 14 to 20 days. Most of the subsidies
went to the providers that had provided the donations.18
When HCFA disallowed most of the matching funds
raised by the donations, the state, while appealing the
disallowance and continuing with its donation policy,
turned to a hospital gross receipts tax (similar to one
used by Florida) as a means of increasing its federal
matching funds. Because some hospitals opposed the
tax, the state and the hospital industry agreed instead on
sharp increases in hospital licensing fees. The legisla-
ture approved the hospital license fee policy in 1989
and extended the mechanism to nursing homes in 1990.
Meanwhile, the DHHS Departmental Appeals Board
had reversed HCFA’s disallowance of the donations
mechanism, so the state had both the donations and tax
options open to it.19
As more states moved to take advantage of the
provider donation and tax policies, HCFA became more
and more concerned. As it considered revising the 1985
regulation and the 1987 instruction, Congress—spurred
by the states—imposed moratoria on its taking action in
1989 and in 1990. After considerable debate during
1991, the Medicaid Voluntary Contribution and
Provider-Specific Tax Amendments of 1991 were
enacted, banning provider donations and restricting
provider taxes as mechanisms for states to draw down
federal Medicaid matching funds.
Medicaid DSH Payments
The fourth loophole involves Medicaid DSH pay-
ments. The Medicaid DSH program offered states a
mechanism to increase federal Medicaid dollars after
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of
1987 had established minimum criteria for them to meet
beginning July 1, 1988, and had required them to make
payment adjustments to hospitals qualifying under the
criteria.20 DSH was an attractive mechanism because, as
already indicated, states could exceed the UPL in
providing funds to hospitals providing high volumes of
care to low-income patients.
According to a September 1998 Urban Institute
study of Medicaid spending, “between 1990 and 1992,
Medicaid grew at an extraordinary 27.1 percent annual
growth rate, with expenditures increasing from $73.7
billion to $119.9 billion in just two years.” The study
indicates that DSH payments “increased by over 250
percent per year.” From 1990 to 1992, “DSH payments
grew at an average annual rate of 263 percent, account-
ing for about $1.3 billion in 1988 and growing to more
than $17 billion by 1992.” From 1995 to 1996, in
contrast, the growth rate fell to -19.6 percent, reflecting
efforts to curb the program.21
The 1991 legislation that banned provider donations
and restricted the types of provider taxes that states could
use also had provisions limiting the growth of DSH
payments to the level of overall program expenditures and
capping DSH payments at 12 percent of program expen-
ditures. Subsequent legislation, OBRA 1993, provided
that only those hospitals that had Medicaid utilization of
at least 1 percent could receive DSH payments and
prohibited states from paying hospitals more than they
were losing through low Medicaid reimbursement rates or
uncompensated care. Both the 1991 and the 1993 laws
had a chilling effect on states’ DSH payments to hospitals
and on states’ Medicaid programs.22
As states changed their DSH programs to comply with
the 1993 legislation, which became effective for different
categories of hospitals in 1994 and in 1995, they began to
turn to IGTs, shifting funds between different levels of
government. “For the DSH program, many states began
to transfer funds from public institutions such as state
psychiatric facilities, university hospitals, and county or
metropolitan hospitals to the state Medicaid agency.” The
state then provided DSH payments to the facilities and
received federal Medicaid matching funds in the
process.23
7 
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) included
additional restrictions on the states. It imposed state-
specific “caps” on the total federal matching payments
available to hospitals receiving DSH payments. In addi-
tion to the provisions in the pending congressional
omnibus bill to implement the UPL regulation and allow
protections for certain states, the legislation would raise
the BBA caps for FY 2001 and future years.
It is important to note—to prevent confusion—that
there is also a Medicare DSH adjustment. An add-on to
Medicare prospective payment system diagnosis-related
groups, it is defined differently than the Medicaid DSH.
The Medicare DSH, as stated in the Social Security
Amendments of 1983, directs the DHHS secretary “to
take into account the special needs . . . of public or other
hospitals that serve a significantly disproportionate
number of patients who have low income or are entitled
to benefits under Part A [Medicare].” The Medicare
DSH adjustment has no bearing on the federal-state
Medicaid match situation.
Use of Matching Funds
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, rumors were
rife that some states were using federal Medicaid
matching funds raised through provider donations and
provider taxes in creative ways, such as to build high-
ways. In testimony before the Subcommittee on Health
and the Environment of the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce [now the Commerce Commit-
tee] in 1991, HCFA Administrator Gail R. Wilensky
said:
We believe that some states are using these “free”
federal funds to increase services, expand access, and
make other positive changes. But nothing in the
current situation even allows us to ensure that ‘free’
federal funds are used in this manner.
On the other hand, the IG reported “these programs
are generally not used to increase services to Medicaid
recipients or improve the quality of care. More often,
they are ‘carefully crafted’ finance techniques that
allow states to reduce their share of Medicaid costs
and force the federal government to pay more.”
In any case, these funds are fungible and states can
use federal funds generated through donation and tax
programs for any purpose they want.24
It was not until the passage of the BBA that the use of
matching funds “for any purpose they want” was
addressed. The act imposed an “explicit ban . . . on the
use of federal Medicaid matching funds for non-health
related items such as bridges, roads, stadiums, or other
items not covered by a state’s Medicaid plan.”
CONFLICT OF VALUES
The tug-of-war between the federal government and
state governments over the UPL issue is indicative of
bigger concerns, such as the difficulties inherent in a
federalist system of shared power and the challenges of
administering a program that has federal rules but gives
states considerable latitude. Moreover, as individual
states seek legislative exceptions to regulatory provisions,
the problems may be exacerbated, as Congress regulates
by exception to the executive branch’s rules that imple-
ment the laws that Congress put in place. The fact that
there may be good intentions on both sides—for example,
HCFA’s seeking fiscal prudence and administrative
fairness while the states strive to provide services to
vulnerable people—reflects a conflict in values.
As indicated, states tend to justify the draw-down
practice on the basis that it helps pay for Medicaid and
other health services and, hence, satisfies a social good.
In testimony submitted to the Senate Finance Committee
at the time of its September hearing, Ann Patla, director
of the Illinois Department of Public Aid, indicated that
her state provides “health care coverage to nearly 10
percent more children, elderly, and disabled individuals
than [it] did one year ago.” Moreover, she said that
Illinois had increased its commitment to “supporting
high-volume Medicaid hospitals that also treat a signifi-
cant number of the uninsured, continuing cost-based
reimbursement for federally qualified health centers, and
shoring up the primary-care infrastructure in Illinois.”
She contended that, if HCFA reversed direction on the
UPL issue, Illinois stood to lose $500 million a year.25
A recent review of HCFA’s intent to regulate
Medicaid UPLs by Leighton Ku of the Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities charted the fiscal status of
states with approved or proposed Medicaid UPL
arrangements (see Table 1, page 8). In presenting the
table, Ku provided the following explanation:
[The table] presents data about several measures of
the fiscal status of states that currently have or are
proposing UPL arrangements. Collectively, these
states had state budget balances of $21 billion in state
FY 2000. [He described the balances as cumulative
surpluses, including “rainy day fund” reserves.] Most
of these states had good, positive balances although a
few states, such as Alabama, Arkansas, New Hamp-
shire, and Tennessee, faced tight fiscal circumstances.
Together, the group of states using or proposing to use
UPL mechanisms cut taxes a total of $4.6 billion for
the year 2000, although a few states with fiscal
problems had to raise taxes. Overall, the strong trend
was to cut state taxes. All except four of these states
reduced taxes at least once in the past four years.26
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Table 1
Fiscal Status of States with Approved or Proposed Medicaid UPL Arrangements
FY 2000
State
Balance
(mil. $)
FY 2000
Balance as %
of Budget
FY 2000 Tax
Changes En-
acted in 1999
(mil. $)
No. of Past 4
Years with
State Tax
Cut
FY 2001
Tobacco
Settlement
(mil. $)
FY 1997
State DSH
Profits
(mil. $)
Alabama* 41 0.8 147 1 112 (25.0)
Alaska 867 37.9 0 1 24 6.0
Arkansas 0 0.0 11 0 57 (0.5)
California* 3,012 4.6 (295) 4 884 376.0
Georgia 545 3.8 0 3 170 74.0
Illinois* 1,350 5.9 82 2 322 168.0
Indiana* 1,617 17.8 (233) 3 141 109.0
Iowa* 574 12.0 (8) 4 60 8.0
Kansas** 318 7.2 28 3 58 32.0
Louisiana 58 1.0 (10) 4 156 462.0
Massachusetts* 1,706 8.7 (68) 4 280 227.0
Michigan* 1,285 13.9 376 3 301 not avail.
Minnesota* 2,370 20.5 (2,084) 3 462 (17.0)
Missouri 435 6.1 (478) 3 158 288.0
Montana 165 15.1 7 1 29 (0.0)
Nebraska* 271 11.6 100 2 41 not avail.
New Hampshire* 0 0.0 617 0 46 not avail.
New Jersey* 1,174 6.0 (70) 3 268 3.0
New Mexico* 143 4.2 (2) 2 41 not avail.
New York 1,170 3.2 (1,092) 4 884 18.0
North Carolina* 38 0.3 6 3 162 158.0
North Dakota* 41 5.3 (2) 2 25 0.7
Oregon* 526 10.8 (93) 1 80 19.0
Pennsylvania* 1,511 7.8 (328) 2 398 not avail.
South Carolina* 464 8.7 (6) 3 82 32.0
South Dakota 37 4.8 20 0 24 0.7
Tennessee* 212 3.1 not avail. 0 169 0.0
Washington 1,175 11.6 (478) 1 142 154.0
Total 21,105 6.4
(nat’l. avg.)
(4,605) 5,574 2,093
Source: Leighton Ku, “Limiting Abuses of Medicaid Financing: HCFA’s Plan to Regulate the Medicaid UPL,” Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities, September 27, 2000,  9-10; accessed November 8, 2000, at http://www. ebpp.org/9-27-00health.htm.
* State had at least one approved UPL arrangement in September 2000, when Ku published his paper. The other states had pending
proposals, and Florida, Texas, and Wisconsin had initiated discussions with HCFA.
** UPL arrangement has lapsed into approval since publication of Ku paper.
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States also justify the draw-down practice on the basis
of preserving safety-net providers. Examples include
California’s reliance on IGTs to increase funding for its
public hospitals and Illinois’s dependence upon them to
add dollars—approximately $200 million a year, accord-
ing to Patla’s testimony—to Cook County Hospital and
its clinics, which serve “indigent children and families,
pregnant women, seniors, and people with disabilities.”27
HCFA’s exemption for public hospitals that are not state-
operated in part addresses this issue, although opponents
contend that the provision just opens up another loophole.
KEY QUESTIONS
The Forum session will address the following issues:
 The “federal-state partnership” has been a hallmark
of the Medicaid program, particularly during the last
eight years, as both the administration and states
sought greater flexibility for the states. Will there
always be a tug-of-war between calls for strict
federal rules, on one hand, and flexibility for the
states, on the other? Is a partnership possible when
so many dollars are involved? Does flexibility
necessarily invite the use of various mechanisms or
loopholes by states, or by certain states? Would a
block-grant approach be better? Or worse?
 Does the ease with which states can circumvent the
federal-state Medicaid matching process mean the
process is inherently flawed?
 In terms of the regulations governing the federal-
state Medicaid match, how important are fairness
and equity among the 50 states?
 Given the fact that certain states have been using the
UPL loophole for close to a decade, why did HCFA
not close it—or try to close it—earlier?
 What are the justifications for HCFA’s exception for
public hospitals in its proposed regulation, which
states that states could pay as much as 150 percent
of the UPL to hospitals that have public ownership
or operation, as long as the controlling entity is not
the state itself?
 Are HCFA’s transition provisions reasonable for
weaning states from IGTs?
 What are the advantages for states that are seeking
legislative fixes to exempt them from the proposed
ban? The disadvantages to other states?
 What are the implications of HCFA’s intended
policy for Medicaid beneficiaries? For other persons
who need health care and are unable to pay for it?
 What is the relationship between the succession of
federal match loopholes and various federal policies?
For example, to Medicaid “unfunded mandates”? To
Medicaid DSH? To lack of coverage for persons who
are uninsured and do not qualify for Medicaid, Medi-
care, SCHIP, or certain other programs?
 What role have legislative or regulatory “fixes” had
in the history of this federal match issue? What role
are they having now, relative to UPLs? Do they
undermine the Medicaid program?
 Given the fragmented health “system” in the United
States, does the end justify the means if the goal is
to provide needed health services to vulnerable
people?
THE FORUM SESSION
Timothy Westmoreland, director of the Center for
Medicaid and State Operations, HCFA, will begin the
meeting with a short description of HCFA’s efforts to
restrict use of IGTs by states to draw down federal
Medicaid matching dollars, reasons for the agency’s
action, and the outlook for closure on it. He has been
director of the center since October 1999, after having
spent four years as a senior policy fellow at the George-
town University Law Center and a senior advisor to the
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. He also has served
as the Washington representative to the Elizabeth
Glaser Pediatric AIDS Foundation. Earlier, he served as
counsel to the House Energy and Commerce Committee
(now the Commerce Committee) Subcommittee on
Health and the Environment. He is a graduate of Yale
Law School.
Kathryn G. Allen, director, Health Care—Medicaid
and Private Health Insurance Issues, at GAO, will de-
scribe the congressional agency’s current analysis of the
UPL issue as well as reference the agency’s work on
earlier financing mechanisms used by states to gain
federal Medicaid payments. She has been at GAO for 24
years. At the present time, she directs work on Medicaid,
SCHIP, long-term care, and private health insurance. Her
career includes leadership positions in GAO’s Seattle and
European field offices and direct staff support to the
National Commission to Prevent Infant Mortality. A
certified government financial manager, she has received
numerous rewards from GAO.
Ann Patla, director of the Illinois Department of
Public Aid, will offer a state perspective on the UPL
debate. As head of the department, she is responsible
for the administration of the state’s  Medicaid, KidCare,
and Child Support Enforcement Program. Before taking
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her current post in early 1999, she was a senior consul-
tant with the University of Illinois at Chicago, where
she worked on managed care issues, juvenile treatment,
and research and evaluation. She also helped design a
new center on aging and geriatric medicine. Earlier, she
served as associate secretary of the Illinois Department
of Human Services and director of the Illinois Depart-
ment of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities.
She has a doctorate in humane letters degree from the
Chicago School of Professional Psychology and is
working on a Ph.D. degree in public policy analysis at
the University of Illinois at Chicago.
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